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DAVID DOYLE Dublin City University
Introduction
Institutionalists ~for example, Christensen, 1997; Gorges, 2001; Mahoney,
2000; Pierson, 2000; Steinmo, 1989; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992! have
regularly argued that crises result in abrupt institutional change. Often,
crises are pointed to as the starting points in a sequence of change, as in
path dependence. Consequently, scholars’ interpretations of institutional
change have resulted in the past’s division into periods of normalcy and
critical junctures.
But Pierson argues that critical junctures, “a concept needed in under-
pinning the analyses of temporal processes, have received only limited
discussion” ~2004: 5–6!. Thelen also points to the lack of sophisticated
tools for understanding change ~1999: 388!. These arguments relate to
the idea that historical institutionalism has tended to concentrate on the
institutional, rather than the historic, side of the approach.
Recently, historical institutionalists have moved from critical junc-
tures to seeking new means to demonstrate how institutions are remade
over time ~Clemens and Cook, 1999; Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 1999, 2000!.
Consequently, the critical junctures concept, an only half-developed
approach as it is entirely postdictive, is being consigned to academic
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history. Simultaneously, with some scholars declaring events critical junc-
tures, watersheds or other turning point terms without the provision of
the least evidence, the concept is being rendered meaningless.
In the past, critical junctures have been examined by means of
unwieldy frameworks ~Collier and Collier, 1991!, or counterfactual analy-
sis ~Fearon, 1991; 1996!. Of late, Hogan sought to develop a framework
with greater rigour ~2005; 2006!. But this involved narrow, in many
instances case specific, criteria, along with arbitrary standards. Scholars
have yet to develop a framework for examining critical junctures that is
rigorous and widely applicable. All previous approaches have also lacked
a predictive element. However, this paper seeks to develop a rigorous,
widely applicable framework for examining critical junctures, one which
incorporates a predictive element.
Our hypothesis is that a critical juncture in macro-economic policy
consists of three stages: macro-economic crisis, ideational change and
radical change in economic policy. The time periods concern rapid changes
in macro-economic policy, as this is synonymous with the concept of
critical junctures. Through the study of five potential macro-economic
crises in two countries, the paper will develop a set of a priori criteria
for examining potential critical junctures. The reason for so many cases
is, as Hall reminds us, broad concepts deserve exploration in many con-
texts and no single case can fully resolve such issues ~1993: 277!. The
paper will show that although there were five potential macro-economic
crises not all were actual crises, and not all actual crises resulted in crit-
ical junctures in macro-economic policy.
The paper will explain what differentiates a macro-economic crisis
that results in a critical juncture in economic policy from one that does
not. This differentiating factor constitutes the predictive element. Once
identified, it will be possible in future to look at any country experienc-
ing economic difficulties, test to see if these difficulties constitute a cri-
sis, test for the differentiating factor’s presence, and then declare if there
will be a critical juncture in that country’s macro-economic policy. This
would remove the longstanding element of contingency associated with
critical junctures by path dependence scholars ~Mahoney, 2000: 513! and
eliminate the necessity of having to wait decades to conclude whether an
event was a critical juncture. While this approach focuses on macro-
economic crisis, and its consequences for macro-economic policy, the
framework could be used to examine a range of crises and their impact
on various policies.
The first section discusses the critical junctures literature, focusing
upon the frameworks developed, issues studied, and the concept’s post-
dictive nature. The second section sets out the countries chosen for exam-
ination, and the time frame of study. The third section sets out and tests
criteria for identifying macro-economic crisis, ideational change and
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macro-economic policy change. The conclusion highlights the findings
and significance of the paper.
1. The Characteristics and Uses of the Critical Junctures Approach
Critical junctures are regarded as the trigger events that set processes of
institutional or policy change, in motion. The literature sees critical junc-
tures resulting in the adoption of an institutional arrangement from among
alternatives ~Mahoney, 2000: 512!. Thereafter, the pathway established
funnels units in a particular direction, with the consequence of increas-
ing returns and the resultant irreversibilities ~Mahoney, 2003: 53; Pier-
son and Skocpol, 2002: 9!. However, Pierson argues that institutional
stability can result from non-path dependent causes, implying that criti-
cal junctures should not be defined by the assumption that they initiate
path dependent processes ~2004!.
For some, the duration of a critical juncture may be brief, while for
others it can constitute an extended period of reorientation ~Mahoney,
2001!. The analysis of critical junctures has been influential in compar-
ative politics. Collier and Collier developed a framework for determin-
ing critical junctures in national development in Latin America ~1991!.
Their definition does not imply institutional innovation occurs in short
episodes ~Thelen, 2004: 215!. For Mahoney, analyzing the nineteenth-
century liberalization of Central America, critical junctures took decades
to come about, while their effects were sometimes of shorter duration
~2001!. Hogan questioned whether these periods could be called critical
junctures or were instances of incremental change ~2005, 2006!, labelled
by Streeck and Thelen as periods of conversion ~2005!.
However, critical junctures have also been employed in research into
short- term change. Garrett and Lange showed that electoral landslides
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create critical junctures by producing mandates for policy change ~1995:
628!. Casper and Taylor employed critical junctures in analyzing when
authoritarian regimes were vulnerable to liberalization ~1996!. Examin-
ing the 1934 Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, Haggard argued that eco-
nomic depression brought into question existing institutions, resulting in
dramatic change ~1988: 91!. Karl used the concept in analyzing the “petro-
states” problematic development paths ~1997!; Gal and Bargal used it to
analyse occupational welfare in Israeli ~2002!, while Vargas examined
the Chiapas conflict ~2004!. Hogan remoulded the framework to exam-
ine change in trade union influence over public policy ~2005; 2006!.
Critical junctures are regarded as pointing to the importance of the
past in explaining the present. They “suggest the importance of forma-
tive moments for institutions and organizations” ~Pierson, 1993: 602!.
Consequently, the studies above are postdictive. But, if focusing on the
formative moments of institutions is critical, only being able to do so
retrospectively constitutes a significant weakness for the concept, some-
thing this paper seeks to remedy.
2. The Countries Selected for Examination
America and Sweden were selected for examination based upon most
similar and most different criteria. For most similar we chose the criteria
of having long-standing democracies and advanced capitalist states. They
are most different according to Lijphart’s categories of majoritarian and
consensual democracies ~1999!, allowing us to control for varying insti-
tutional arrangements. Both countries’ economies are very different, while
their performances, and the policies governing them, have varied dramat-
ically. Thus, their similarities ensure “the contexts of analysis are analyt-
ically equivalent to a significant degree,” while their differences place
“parallel processes of change in sharp relief ” ~Collier, 1997: 40!. We
examine potential crises in their economic performance between 1945
and 2000.
3.1 The Identification of Macro-economic Crisis
“An important part of the literature on critical junctures views them from
the perspective of crises, placing particular emphasis on the tensions lead-
ing up to the critical juncture” ~Collier and Collier, 1991: 32!. “Tradi-
tionally, students of institutional change focused on the importance of
crisis” ~Cortell and Peterson, 1999: 184!. Exogenous shock is often cited
as an explanation for policy change ~Greener, 2001; Golob, 2003: 373!.
Here the crises being searched for are macro-economic. “Most scholars
agree that severe recessions make significant structural changes possible
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because they render politics highly fluid” ~Garrett, 1993: 522!. Govern-
ments and political parties—and their economic policies—are exposed
to the impact of economic fluctuations. A macro-economic crisis can call
into question existing institutions, policies or even state projects, conse-
quently triggering change ~Tilly, 1975!.
Macro-economic crises are rare events, rendering definition and iden-
tification difficult ~Yu et al., 2006: 439!. Consequently, how do we iden-
tify a macro-economic crisis? Stone argues that a situation does not
become a problem until it is seen as amenable to control ~1989: 299!.
But, if it is controllable it must be measurable; otherwise, how would we
know if we are controlling the situation? Thus, a macro-economic crisis
must be quantifiable to some extent. Kaminsky et al. ~1998! and Berg
and Pattillo ~1999! advocated the use of individual variables when quan-
tifying currency crises, a concept equally applicable to macro-economic
crises. Pei and Adesnik developed a broader range of criteria for identi-
fying macro-economic crises: an annual inflation rate greater than 15
per cent, stagnant or negative annual gross domestic product ~GDP!
growth, and historians and other analysts’ descriptions of significant
deterioration in economic and financial circumstances ~2000: 138–39!.
For Garuba ~2006: 21!, Kwon ~2001: 105!, and Solimano ~2005: 76! a
macro-economic crisis can be seen in general indicators and perceptions
of growth, inflation, employment creation, poverty reduction and their
combined socio-psychological burden on society. However, unlikeYu et al.
~2006!, we are not seeking to forecast macro-economic crises, merely to
identify them.
As Pei and Adesnik note, defining any macro-economic downturn
as a crisis requires subjective and objective deliberations ~2000: 139!.
Consequently, González suggests the adoption of a multifaceted approach
~2005: 93!, as these are situations in which failure is identified and widely
perceived ~Hay, 1999: 324!. Agents must diagnose the crisis and impose
on others their notion of it before collective action to resolve uncertainty
can take meaningful form ~Blyth, 2002: 9!. This fits with Hay’s percep-
tion of crisis as the triumph of a simplifying ideology ~1999: 321!. Con-
sequently, we develop a broad range of observable implications, which
include, and build upon, the objective and subjective criteria of previous
studies. These implications accept that a macro-economic crisis must con-
stitute a severe economic low point.
Macro-economic crisis
The first three observables, largely quantitative in nature, are derived from
Pei and Adesnik ~2000!, and Solimano ~2005!. However, we employ a
lower inflation threshold than Pei and Adesnik, as the developed states
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studied here are not as susceptible to severe inflationary fluctuations as
their developing counterparts.
The latter observables are partly derived from Pei and Adesnik’s rec-
ommendation to examine historians and other analysts’ descriptions of
economic deterioration to determine if there is a crisis ~2000!. However,
they also draw upon the work of Garuba ~2006!, Kwon ~2001!, and Soli-
mano ~2005! whose measures for economic crisis are more qualitative,
and contextual, than quantitative.
O1. If the main economic indicators reached decade-long lows, the econ-
omy may have been in crisis.
O2. If annual inflation is greater than 10 per cent, the economy may
have been in crisis.
O3. If annual GDP growth is stagnant or negative, the economy may
have been in crisis.
O4. If opinion polls find the public regarded the economy in crisis, the
economy may have been in crisis.
O5. If the national media regarded the economy in crisis, the economy
may have been in crisis.
O6. If economic and political commentators regarded the economy in
crisis, the economy may have been in crisis.
O7. If the central bank regarded the economy in crisis, the economy
may have been in crisis.
O8. If both domestic and international organizations ~Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development ~OECD!! monitoring
economic performance regarded the economy in crisis, the econ-
omy may have been in crisis.
O9. If elected representatives regarded the economy in crisis, the econ-
omy may have been in crisis.
O10. If government pronouncements on the economy were consistent
with a crisis management approach, the economy may have been
in crisis.
As space permits only the briefest review of the material examined,
we concentrate on the most likely macro-economic crises identified.
The United States of America
Here we examine three possible macro-economic crises.
According to the OECD, by the late 1950s America was suffering
from a large deficit ~1962: 5!. Time International stated that the econ-
omy was in recession ~1959: 14!. The rate of unemployment stood at
5.5 per cent, or 3.7 million. For the Labor Department, anything above 3
million indicated economic weakness. Inflation was at 1.5 per cent in
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1959 and 1.3 per cent in 1960, while GDP growth fell from 7.2 per cent
to 2.4 per cent in 1960 ~Mitchell, 1998!. “By 1960 economists argued
that the economy was slumping dangerously” ~Heath, 1975: 63!. The Sec-
retary of the Treasury admitted as much to the IMF ~The Economist,
1960: 42!. Democratic presidential candidate Kennedy observed that in
1959 America experienced the lowest growth of any major industrialized
country. “You don’t see a burgeoning economy,” agreed his Republican
rival Nixon ~Time International, 1960: 13!. However, these factors were
not sufficient to constitute an economic crisis.
For the OECD, the Carter administration’s final year was character-
ized by high interest rates, and rising unemployment ~1982: 9!. Com-
pounding matters, the National Bureau of Economic Research declared
the economy in recession ~Time International, 1980: 48!. When the Pres-
ident invoked the Credit Control Act, it resulted in reduced borrowing
and a steep decline in growth ~Byron, 1980a: 44!. By 1979, inflation
stood at 11.3 per cent, rising to 13.5 per cent in 1980, while GDP growth
struggled at 2.4 per cent in 1979, before slumping to 0.3 per cent by
1980 ~Mitchell, 1998!. By the second half of 1980 the administration’s
responses to the recession smacked of crisis management. Carter’s Eco-
nomic Renewal Program designed to stimulate the economy was severely
criticized ~Cowan, 1980: 12!. By November, Fed Chairman Volcker admit-
ted there was a recession ~Berry, 1980: B1!. In restraining the growth
of the money supply, the Fed pushed interest rates to their highest lev-
els in a century, reducing consumer borrowing and sending spending
into decline ~Time International, 1980: 50!. “Through the actions of the
Reserve Board and the administration, the economy was inadvertently
plunged into the kind of recession the White House had been trying to
avoid” ~Dark, 1999: 120!.
By 1992 the economy was in serious trouble ~Caple, 1991: 3!. In
December 1990, Fed Chairman Greenspan called the downturn “mean-
ingful” ~Time International, 1990: 50!. The OECD ~1993: 18–29! showed
that the economy had shrunk 1.2 per cent in 1991, while the budget def-
icit reached $290 billion in 1992, with federal debt surpassing $4 tril-
lion. Inflation ran at 2.9 per cent in 1991 and 1992, while GDP growth
was 0.9 per cent in 1991 before rising to 2.7 per cent in 1992 ~Mitchell,
1998!. The Wall Street Journal warned the deficit was out of control
~1992: 10!, leaving no room to stimulate the economy ~Gwynne, 1992:
32!. The Gulf War, the savings and loan bailout, defence-industry con-
traction, real estate depression and soaring welfare payments wreaked
havoc with budget-balancing efforts ~Gwynne, 1992: 31!. Unemploy-
ment peaked at 7.8 per cent in mid-1992. President Bush admitted that
his administration had botched the recession ~Carlson, 1992: 28!. This
downturn became the longest recession since the Great Depression
~Gwynne, 1992: 31!.
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Sweden
Here we examine two potential macro-economic crises.
The recession that began in the mid 1970s proved persistent. The
OECD ~1982: 49! described the economy in 1982 as in difficulty. Gov-
ernment’s expenditures had grown, while revenues stagnated. Budget def-
icits were financed by international borrowing ~Siven, 1984: 17!, and, as
a consequence, the debt to GNP ratio increased by 250 per cent in six
years. In 1981 inflation reached 12.1 per cent, while GDP contracted by
0.6 per cent ~The Economist, 1982: 41!. Unemployment reached 3.1 per
cent in 1982, its highest level since 1945, a political scandal in a country
accustomed to full employment ~Apple Jr., 1982: 3!. However, econo-
mists believed unemployment would have been closer to 16 per cent if it
included the jobless in training programs, workers forced into early retire-
ment and those who had given up looking for work ~Time International,
1982: 32!. The New York Times argued that the Swedish economy had
been hobbled by foreign debt, low investment and an adverse balance of
payments ~Prokesch, 1991: 1!. The economy was in crisis.
Although prosperity returned during the 1980s, by the 1990s, Swe-
den was suffering further economic malaise. Attempts to maintain indus-
trial competitiveness, an enormous public sector and full employment
resulted in spiralling inflation ~The Economist, 1991: 61!. The Bank of
International Settlement observed that Sweden’s 10.5 per cent inflation
rate was the worst of the ten leading industrialized countries ~The Times,
1991: 4!. In 1990 prices rose by 6.6 per cent, against the OECD average
of 4.5 per cent ~1992: 12!. GDP contracted by 1.1 per cent in 1991 and
1.4 per cent in 1992 ~Mitchell, 1993!. That autumn, the real estate mar-
ket collapsed, putting the banking system in jeopardy ~Hill, 1991: 2! and
threatening the country’s financial infrastructure ~Martin, 2000: 246!.
Unemployment increased from 1.7 per cent in 1990 ~Benjamin, 1991:
21! to 5.3 per cent in 1992. The current budget deficit, public sector
borrowing requirement, and national debt, all rose as the economy con-
tracted ~The Economist, 1991: 38!. Linton stated that “this was the first
time the @Swedish# economy contracted since 1942” ~1991: 5!. “Sweden
is in a very severe recession. There is crisis in every part of the pub-
lic sector,” said Anders Aslund, Sweden’s leading economist ~Kaslow,
1991: 3!.
Of the five potential macro-economic crises, four constituted authen-
tic crises, satisfying all, or most, of the observable implications. As can
be seen in Table 1, America 1959–1961 satisfied only one observable
implication, and thus could not be a severe economic low point. The next
section will examine the four macro-economic crises to see if ideational
change occurred at these times, and, central to our hypothesis, if policy
change followed ideational change.
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3.2 Identification of Ideational and Policy Change
A crisis presents new problems, as previous policies are discredited due
to their implication in, or inability to right, the situation ~Levy, 1994!.
Economic crises can have a great impact, shaping a range of alterna-
tives, but they will not determine policy choices. These remain “firmly
centred in domestic political and ideational processes” ~Golob, 2003: 375!.
Ideas are crucial in determining policy choices due to uncertainty over
the basic workings of the macro-economy, the difficulties of interpreting
policy effectiveness and the lack of agreement over what constitutes “cor-
rect” macro-economic policy ~McNamara, 1998: 57!. When an eco-
nomic model is in flux, windows of opportunity will appear in which
change agents will contest the viability of the prevailing paradigm ~King-
don, 1995!. They will present new ideas to replace the ones upon which
existing policy is based. Thus, ideas influence policy by acting through
particular actors ~Berman, 1998: 22!. We contend that significant policy
change is dependent upon agents of change reaching a broad consensus
upon, and subsequently consolidating around, one particular set of new
ideas. These ideas will determine the path of subsequent policy, as pol-
icy makers work within a framework of ideas and standards that specify
not only the goals of policy, but the instruments to be used to achieve
TABLE 1
The Identification of Macro-economic Crisis
America Sweden
Observable Implications
1959–
1961
1979–
1981
1990–
1992
1980–
1982
1990–
1992
O1. Were the main economic indicators at
decade-long lows? X X X X
O2. Was annual inflation greater than 10 per cent? X X X
O3. Was GDP growth stagnant or negative? X X X X
O4. Did the public regard the economy in crisis? X X
O5. Did the media regard the economy in crisis? X X X X X
O6. Did economic and political commentators
regard the economy in crisis? X X X X
O7. Did the central bank regard the economy
in crisis? X X X
O8. Did domestic0international organizations
regard the economy in crisis? X X X X
O9. Did elected representatives regard the
economy in crisis? X X X X
O10. Were government pronouncements on the
economy consistent with a crisis management
approach? X X X X
Economic Crisis X X X X
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these goals and the very nature of the problems they are meant to be ad-
dressing ~Hall, 1993: 279!.
The period of flux outlined above is similar to Blyth’s “discursive
phase,” where “agents interested in reforming existing distributional
arrangements contest the definition, meaning and solution to the prob-
lems identified by opposing economic ideologies” ~1997: 234!. It is also
analogous to what Oliver and Pemberton ~2004: 419! describe as the
“institutional battle.” “Economic ideas facilitate the reduction of...barri-
ers by acting as coalition-building resources among agents who attempt
to resolve the crisis” ~Blyth, 2002: 37!. Thus, ideas are the casual mech-
anisms of change in any critical juncture ~Golob, 2003!.
Once agents coalesce around a set ideas purporting to offer a solu-
tion to current economic woes, and an alternative to the current para-
digm, they will attempt to “inject” these into the policy domain. We
contend there are three groupings of change agents. The most important
agents are what Dahl ~1961! termed “political entrepreneurs.” Political
entrepreneurs, according to Sheingate ~2003: 188–90!, “exploit moments
of instability” and “invest resources in the creation of a new policy, a
new agency or new forms of collective action.” They are similar to King-
don’s broader concept of policy entrepreneurs ~1995!, which constitute
our second group of change agents. Policy entrepreneurs encompass civil
servants, technocrats, academics, economists and interest groups, and so
forth, who engage in policy innovation, and have access to decision mak-
ers. However, Sheingate highlights the role of political leaders as politi-
cal entrepreneurs: in times of crisis, “uncertainty makes possible the
speculative, entrepreneurial quality of everyday politics ... as politicians
engage in a steady search for political advantage” ~2003: 192!. Thus, in
a crisis, a political leader, usually an opposition leader, will introduce
new economic policy ideas to rectify the ills of the existing paradigm.
Policy entrepreneurs are generally responsible for producing ideas, but it
is the political entrepreneur who acts as a figurehead, introducing these
ideas into the policy process. As Margaret Thatcher quipped to Ralph
Harris of the Institute of Economic Affairs ~IEA!, when he claimed the
IEA had been advocating market reform twenty years before her time,
“Ralph, the cock may crow but it’s the hen that lays the egg” ~Wolf, 2006:
15!. The triumph of a new idea depends upon “a workable new idea being
available” which change agents are prepared to adopt and promote ~Oli-
ver and Pemberton, 2004: 419!.
The final group of change agents are outside influences, encompass-
ing the media, and international organizations, such as the OECD. They
will critique an existing economic paradigm, advocating a new set of
ideas as an alternative. These three broad groupings are similar to those
identified by Pemberton in his schema of policy learning ~2000: 777!.
He notes that while minor policy changes emanate from administrators,
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significant changes are dominated by academics, economists, interest
groups, the media and, in particular, politicians.
Greener sees an important role for exogenous shocks in securing
the triumph of a new policy paradigm ~2001: 134!. However, we hypoth-
esize that a macro-economic crisis is a necessary, but insufficient, con-
dition for change in macro-economic policy. Instead, a macro-economic
crisis will result in debate regarding the economy and the generation of
new ideas. The consolidation of agents around a set of new ideas is cru-
cial for policy change. This corresponds to McNamara’s argument that
actors utilize new ideas to chart new policy strategy ~1998: 4–5!. Con-
sequently, the following observable implications seek to identify the gen-
eration of new economic ideas by agents.
O1. A clear change agent ~political entrepreneur! to inject new ideas
into the policy arena is apparent.
O2. Opposition political parties critique the current model and propose
alternative economic ideas; at election time their platform will be
built around these alternative ideas.
O3. Civil society organizations, such as labour unions, employer orga-
nizations, consumer groups, and so forth, critique the current model,
reflecting Hall’s coalition-centred approach ~1989: 12!.
O4. Policy entrepreneurs have developed a clear set of alternative eco-
nomic ideas.
O5. Widespread public dissatisfaction with the current paradigm is
observable through opinion polls, protests, and so forth.
O6. External or international organizations critique the current model
and0or actively disseminate alternative economic ideas to replace it.
O7. The media question the efficacy of the current economic model
and0or specific policy areas.
Should a broad range of agents agree that the prevailing paradigm is inad-
equate and should be replaced—the first stage of Legro’s model of rapid
ideational change ~2000: 419!—collapse will have occurred. However,
“even when ideational collapse occurs, failure to reach consensus on a
replacement could still produce continuity, as society reflexively re-
embraces the old orthodoxy” ~Legro, 2000: 424!. Walsh sees this as the
continuation of failed policies due to a lack of coherent intellectual links
between policy tools and desired outcomes ~2006: 494!.
Thus, in the wake of ideational collapse, the issue is reaching con-
sensus on a new set of ideas. If consensus is achieved, it constitutes the
second stage of Legro’s model—consolidation—agents co-ordinating a
replacement set of ideas to the reigning consensus. This can be seen in
political entrepreneurs consolidating their innovations by combining a mix-
ture of interests to produce a winning coalition ~Sheingate, 2003: 192–93!.
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Extant ideas constitute the “armour” protecting policies. The greater
the level of consensus encompassing an idea, the heavier the armour pro-
tecting the policies derived from it. Armoured policies represent conti-
nuity, whereby once a policy has become institutionally embedded, “policy
making becomes possible only in terms of these ideas” ~Blyth, 2001: 4!.
Referring to policies as armoured is similar to Golob’s notion of “policy
frontiers” ~2003: 363!.
However, with the replacement of old ideas, the policies based upon
them will have lost their armour protection. Pemberton argues that new
ideas change the wider policy environment ~2000: 790!. Thus, we hypoth-
esize that once there is consolidation around a new set of ideas, a sig-
nificant change in policy should follow. In this regard ideational change
will constitute the “differentiating factor” between crises that result in
radical policy change and those that do not. Therefore, we must dis-
cover if radical changes in economic policy follow ideational change.
Thus, we base our final set of observable implications upon the con-
cepts of first-, second- and third-order changes in policy developed by
Hall. Hall argued that policy failures and exogenous shocks can set off
processes that lead to ideational change to the extent of resulting in the
re-examination of the belief systems through which policy has been
generated—a paradigmatic ~third-order! policy change ~1993: 291!. These
observables will enable us identify, and differentiate, both normal and
fundamental shifts in a country’s macro-economic policies. However,
the observables set out here also incorporate the ideas of swift and en-
during change developed by Hogan ~2005!. As we are dealing with
the idea of radical change we assume that this is not a long process;
otherwise it would constitute incremental change. Also, if the change
is to endure in a policy environment full of competing actors, policy
entrepreneurs and policies in search of a home, it should survive for at
least one change of government. Otherwise, the new policies will have
proven themselves lacking armoured protection ~institutional embedding!
necessary for them to endure. As we are searching for paradigm shift in
macro-economic policy this must encompass all three of the observables
below.
O1. If economic policy instrument settings changed ~swiftly, but lasting
longer than one government’s term of office! there may have been a
radical change in government economic policy.
O2. If the instruments of economic policy changed ~swiftly, but lasting
longer than one government’s term of office! there may have been a
radical change in government economic policy.
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy changed ~swiftly,
but lasting longer than one government’s term of office! there may
have been a radical change in government economic policy.
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America 1979–1981
By the end of Carter’s administration the economy was in trouble. Paul
Volcker, Federal Reserve Chairman, believed the remedy for spiralling
inflation was a tightened money supply ~Krugman, 1990!, the first coher-
ent move towards monetarist policy. However, the results were limited.
The president’s imposition of controls on consumer credit contributed to
the economy’s slide. Consequently, there was widespread dissatisfaction
with, and critiques of, government policy.
Byron argued that Carter’s decisions resulted in reduced in con-
sumer borrowing and a steep decline in growth ~1980a: 44!. “Recession
Hits Hard” headlined The Washington Post ~Atkinson, 1980: L1!. Eco-
nomic commentators were pessimistic on the prospects for recovery. The
economy was in what Walter Okun called “the great stagflation swamp”
~Byron, 1980b: 17!. The president’s inflation record is not good ad-
mitted Walter Heller. In allowing the economy deteriorate, noted Alan
Greenspan, Carter was forced into a crash program of restraint, leading
to a huge rise in unemployment ~Time International, 1980: 45!. Cri-
tiques began to coalesce around a set of alternative ideas purporting to
tackle current economic ills: monetarism. With agents in agreement on
the inadequacy of the extant paradigm, ideational collapse had occurred.
Monetarist concepts had been present in American political circles
since the early 1970s, with Milton Friedman, Robert Lucas and Arthur
Laffer founding organizations like the American Enterprise Institute
~Blyth, 1997: 236–37!. These groups ensured that by the late 1970s Amer-
ican economic journalism propagated their ideas ~Blyth, 1997: 237!, with
the Wall Street Journal acting as both “effective synthesizer and chief
proselytizer for these ... ideas” ~Blyth, 2002: 164!. In this respect a clear
set of alternative ideas and policy entrepreneurs were present.
However, it was Ronald Reagan, Republican presidential candidate,
who embraced this new ideology, adopting the role of political entrepre-
neur. His message was lower taxes, reduced spending on social services,
balanced budgets and fewer governmental regulations. He blamed the
Democrats’ inflationary policies for stifling productivity and bringing
recession. In late August, Reagan stated that President Carter had “cre-
ated a severe depression” ~Kelly, 1980: 9!. He promised new policies
and leadership ~Wayne, 1992: 182!. During the final stages of the elec-
tion Reagan declared Carter’s record on inflation and unemployment “a
failure on a scale so vast, in dimensions so broad, with effects so devas-
tating, that it is virtually without parallel” ~Church, 1980: 17!. Reagan
forged an electoral coalition around the notion of monetarism ~Blyth,
1997! and won the election on the back of having a discernable set of
alternative economic ideas which could replace existing arrangements.
For the OECD, President Reagan’s election, and the accompanying Con-
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gressional election, was a clear mandate for conservative policies ~1982:
10!. In the wake of an economic crisis, and with the paradigm underly-
ing extant economic policy collapsed, change agents reached consensus
and consolidated around a new economic orthodoxy. Monetarism’s accep-
tance as a viable alternative idea constituted ideational change.
The new administration’s economic policies were very different from
those of its predecessors in their political roots and theoretical founda-
tions ~OECD, 1982: 9!. Reagan fashioned his economic strategy around
Arthur Laffer’s monetarist proposals. To combat stagflation he promoted
a painless panacea: tax cuts, and deregulation, wherein the resulting stim-
ulus would boost federal revenues to balance the budget, reducing infla-
tionary pressure. The new president’s program, dubbed Reaganomics,
constituted the belief that American capitalism, freed from the burden of
taxes and regulation, would surge ahead. Reagan’s first budget proposed
a $750 billion tax cut over three years ~Jones, 1995: 597!. The adminis-
tration also cut $11 billion from public works and job training programs,
unemployment benefits and trade adjustment assistance benefits ~Brown,
1981: A1!. According to the OECD “a trend towards reduced economic
regulation was carried further by the immediate application of the remain-
ing stages of crude oil price decontrol and the abolition of the Council
on Wage and Price Stability” ~1982: 24!.
In political terms Reagan capitalized on anti-government sentiment,
emphasizing individualism and a smaller Federal role. Tax relief was allied
to a restructuring of federal expenditure, bringing sharp changes in the
fiscal influence on the economy. Economic policy instrument settings,
the instruments themselves and the goals behind economic policy, all
changed. This third-order change ~paradigm shift! in macro-economic
policy endured into the administration of Reagan’s successor. D’Souza
saw Reagan’s program for America as the most ambitious since the New
Deal ~1997: 85!.
An economic crisis led to the collapse of the ideas underlying exist-
ing macro-economic policy. Policy and political entrepreneurs advocated
a replacement set of ideas: monetarism. Consolidation around this new
economic orthodoxy was achieved with Ronald Reagan. Following
his election there was a third-order change ~paradigm shift! in macro-
economic policy. Thus, we have a macro-economic crisis, ideational
change, and a radical change in macro-economic policy, which accord-
ing to our overarching hypothesis constitutes a critical juncture in macro-
economic policy.
America 1990–1992
The Bush administration was blamed for the recession of the early 1990s.
The Gulf War, along with a range of domestic economic problems, left a
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legacy of disastrous budget deficits. With national debt exceeding $4 tril-
lion, and huge interest repayments, artificially stimulating the economy
was not an option ~Mufson, 1992: A1!.
The public had lost faith in the administration’s ability to manage
the economy. An August 1992 poll showed only 22 per cent of the public
regarded President Bush as doing a good job ~Morin and Schwartz, 1992:
A1!. A Newsweek poll the following month produced similar results
~Levinson, 1992a: 40!. Time argued that the Reagan0Bush administra-
tions were largely responsible for the national debt. The New York Times
stated that Bush had seriously mismanaged the economy ~Passell, 1992:
2!. However, when new taxes were levied, vicious criticism ensued. “Read
My Lips: I Lied” proclaimed a New York Post headline ~1990: 1!. “Anx-
ious about the economic future?” asked Newsweek, “if you aren’t you
should be,” it warned ~Levinson, 1992b: 44!. Even the World Bank
attacked Bush’s economic management. World Bank chief Laurence Sum-
mers said, “The most important lesson of elementary economics Amer-
ica must learn is: deficit finance is not an alternate to cutting spending
or raising taxes” ~Greenhouse, 1992: A1!. Confidence in extant eco-
nomic ideas had collapsed.
The 1992 Democrat presidential nominee, Bill Clinton, attacked the
administration for the economy’s ills. Clinton pledged an activist govern-
ment addressing the economy, jobs, and health care. His campaign focused
on the recession, with the famous maxim: “the economy, stupid!” ~Time
International, 1992: 38!. Although critiques of Bush’s administration were
rife, unlike the previous example, these debates did not coalesce around
an alternative set of economic ideas. Clinton merely repackaged existing
ideas. Without alternative ideas for agents to consolidate around, the result
was continuity with the old economic orthodoxy. Clinton was elected on
the back of Bush’s unpopularity, with economic proposals aimed at rec-
tifying Bush’s errors, rather than changing economic policy. The ideas
he espoused did not constitute an alternative economic paradigm nor were
any significant change agents present.
Nevertheless, Clinton, determined to revive the economy, oversaw
some changes in economic policy. He argued for a new economic pro-
gram to put people back to work ~Clinton, 1992: 46!. Seeking to shed
the Democratic Party’s reputation for ultra-liberalism, and wasteful spend-
ing, Clinton sought to court middle class and blue-collar voters, who once
composed the party’s backbone, but, in so doing, he failed to bring about
a third-order change ~paradigm shift! in macro-economic policy.
The recession shaped much of Clinton’s agenda. The OECD argued
that his administration’s economic strategy was built on the view that
government could improve market outcomes and had greater scope for
correcting market failures. “The zeal for deregulation has waned since
the mid-1980s, and the government seems willing to turn to new regula-
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tion to achieve its social objectives in an environment of budgetary strin-
gency” ~OECD, 1993: 117!.
Rejecting the “trickle-down” approach of his predecessors, Clinton
proposed revitalizing the economy through investment in infrastructure
and education ~French, 1997: 52!. His 1993 economic program pro-
posed spending cuts and tax increases, with a deficit reduction of $325
billion over four years. One of the program’s main components was a
$169 billion stimulus package. In August, Congress passed a five-year
economic plan incorporating Clinton’s spending cuts and tax increases,
while gutting his stimulus package. The OECD argued that this deficit-
reduction plan alleviated fiscal imbalances ~1993: 113!.
While the administration was committed to bringing down the def-
icit to ease the drain on national savings, it also showed a willingness to
counter rising income inequality, secure faster job creation and support
higher rates of investment. Although economic policy instrument set-
tings, and the instruments themselves, may have changed, the hierarchy
of goals behind economic policy did not. This constituted a second-order
change in macro-economic policy.
The economic crisis witnessed the collapse of extant economic ortho-
doxy. However, change agents did not consolidate around a clear set of
alternative economic ideas. The ideas underpinning the economic poli-
cies of the Regan0Bush years endured, providing them with a level of
armoured protection sufficient to deflect unconsolidated ideational attack.
There was no critical juncture in economic policy.
Sweden 1980–1982
The recession of the 1970s saw the budget deficits supporting the wel-
fare system deepen. By 1981 the non-socialist coalition government held
only 102 of the 350 seats in the Riksdag ~Swedish Politics, 2006!. That
autumn the krona was devalued by 10 per cent, and the following spring
the government introduced far-reaching austerity measures. However, the
opposition parties gained ground ~Hadenius, 1997: 129–30!. The govern-
ment hoped its attempts to combat the economy’s problems would gen-
erate respect for non-socialist policies; instead they generated widespread
critiques, and initiated a debate on the economy. The Financial Times
pointed out that the Swedes were nervous about the future but reluctant
to see the welfare state’s benefits reduced ~Dullforce, 1982a: 15!. “The
welfare state is in a crisis of legitimacy,” observed Hans Vetterberg,
Sweden’s leading public opinion analyst. “We can no longer afford to
keep expanding it” ~Osnos, 1982: A15!. The Swedish Employers’ Feder-
ation ~SAF! was unhappy with the government. However, the non-socialist
government wanted neither to raise taxes, nor dismantle the welfare state
~Time International, 1982: 32!. This situation, rife with unfulfilled eco-
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nomic expectations and agents dissatisfied with the prevailing paradigm,
constituted ideational collapse.
The 1982 election was regarded as determining whether public opin-
ion had shifted, as in Norway and Denmark, away from social democ-
racy. The election campaign was dominated by talk of economic crisis—a
$10 billion debt to foreign banks, inflation, declining exports and increas-
ing unemployment ~Osnos, 1982: A15!. During the campaign the Social
Democrats attacked the viability of another non-socialist government and
their economic policies. The party presented a program on how Sweden
could save and work its way out of crisis. The debates surrounding the
election failed to generate either a coherent set of alternative economic
ideas to replace existing ones or a significant change agent. Despite the
dominant orthodoxy’s failure, the non-socialist parties failed to create
a coalition around alternative ideas to the welfare state, and nearly all
economic ideas presented were variations on existing themes. Without
consolidation around a new ideational orthodoxy agents ref lexively
re-embraced the old. In lieu of alternatives, the ideas underpinning the
policies of the welfare state endured. The SAP won the election, not on
the back of a new economic paradigm to cure the country’s woes but on
a series of proposals to rectify existing economic arrangements.
The result precipitated an altered approach to economic manage-
ment, with minor changes in policies. The SAP, admitting there were no
ready solutions to the economy’s problems ~Apple Jr., 1982: 3!, imple-
mented a recovery program: the Third Road. They argued that renewed
growth required redistribution of income from labour to capital. It con-
stituted a shift in SAP economic planning, behind which course lay the
influence of its research unit, as opposed to those of the unions. This
marked an attempt to maintain a level of social democracy, which other
countries were rolling it back ~Martin, 2000: 234!. The Third Road sought
to devise a wide-ranging stabilization program encompassing demand
management measures, as well as initiatives to promote structural change
and ensure an equitable distribution of the burden of adjustment ~OECD,
1984: 21!. The SAP was also determined to pour funds into job-creating
industries.
The centrepiece of Finance Minister Feldt’s strategy to boost corpo-
rate profits was devaluation of the krona. This measure was implemented,
in conjunction with a price freeze and increases in sales and corporate
taxes, in a sweeping “crisis plan” aimed at stimulating the economy ~Dull-
force, 1982b: 1; The Washington Post, 1982: A16!. According to the
OECD the objective was to achieve export-led, investment-driven, recov-
ery ~1984: 21!. The Landsorganisationen i Sverige ~LO! accommodated
devaluation by demanding average wage increases of 2.5 per cent in ensu-
ing wage bargaining. The devaluation and international economic recov-
ery resulted in high earnings and excellent scope for export expansion
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~Ahlén, 1989: 333!. The government also restored welfare entitlements
cut by the non-socialists ~OECD, 1984: 23!.
To maintain the welfare state by whatever means necessary the gov-
ernment prioritized private sector growth, profits and market forces. In
this case, the economic policy instrument settings changed, but the instru-
ments of economic policy, and the goals behind it, remained much the
same: maintenance of the welfare state. This constituted a first-order pol-
icy change.
The economic crisis in Sweden generated significant debate and a
form of ideational collapse occurred. However, change agents did not
consolidate around a replacement economic orthodoxy. The extant eco-
nomic paradigm endured, providing the existing economic policies with
sufficient armoured protection to remain largely intact. There was no crit-
ical juncture in economic policy.
Sweden 1990–1992
Sweden’s economic crisis in the early 1990s provided a window of oppor-
tunity for monetarist ideas. Following the SAP’s election in 1982, a num-
ber of agents began coalescing around these ideas. The SAF created the
Centre for Business and Policy Studies ~SNS! and Timbro to disseminate
monetarist ideas, which gained ground, especially among influential econ-
omists ~Blyth 2002: 214–15!. Political and policy entrepreneurs, consist-
ing of the leaderships of the Conservative and Liberal parties, the policy
elites outside the original social bargain, and the SNS and SAF began
aggressively propagating these ideas ~Blyth, 1997: 239!.
Meanwhile, the media continued to harangue the SAP government,
and its policy failures. The New York Times stated that the economy was
stagnant ~Prokesch, 1991: 1!. The Financial Times pointed out that in
1991, under the impact of weak foreign demand and losses in competi-
tiveness, Swedish exporters lost ground internationally ~Taylor, 1991a: v!.
The Washington Post argued that Swedes were troubled by the country’s
slow growth and their inability to maintain the standard of living they
were accustomed to ~1991: A18!.
Once the economy entered freefall, critiques of the SAP’s policies
by the media, the opposition, and the OECD, enabled change agents to
propose monetarism as an alternative economic paradigm. In an environ-
ment of unfulfilled economic expectations, contestation of the existing
economic orthodoxy by agents, agreed on its inadequacy and need for
replacement, resulted in its collapse. From the mid-1980s onwards the
SAF, among others, increasingly called into question the corporatist sys-
tem ~de Geer, 1992: 155–57!. The SAF assumed the role of a vigorous
policy entrepreneur, mounting intense publicity campaigns to improve
the electoral prospects of the Liberal and Conservative parties. The SAF’s
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ideas on privatization, and deregulation, also influenced the SAP govern-
ment which, to combat the crisis, began incorporating monetarist ideas
into policy. In 1990 currency outflows prompted the Riksbank to increase
interest rates ~Agence France Presse, 1991: 8!. To reduce inflation, the
government tightened fiscal policy ~OECD, 1992: 11!, a significant change
in macro-economic policy for an SAP government that previously gave
priority to high employment. As the economy depended on tight fiscal
and monetary policies, this meant keeping inflation at the European level,
even at the cost of unemployment, something previously unacceptable
~Taylor, 1991a: v!. The January 1991 budget highlighted the consolida-
tion of monetarist ideas, as low inflation became the objective of eco-
nomic policy ~OECD, 1992: 39!.
The internationalization of financial markets restricted the ability of
the government to pursue economic policies diverging from those of other
capitalist states, forming a “cognitive lock” ~Blyth, 2002!. Policies dis-
approved of by industrialists ~and foreign currency dealers! became
increasingly difficult to implement ~Marshall, 1996: 9!.
The 1991 election saw the opposition parties reach consensus around
monetarist ideas, a coherent set of alternative theories to rectify the econ-
omy. Following the election, Carl Bildt, leader of the Moderate Party,
formed a four-party government advocating a switch to monetarism. The
Financial Times observed that “Swedish politics have reached the end of
the social democratic era” ~Taylor, 1991b: 3!. Bildt summed up the result
as “a massive mandate for change” ~Taylor, 1991b: 3!. Thus, following
an economic crisis, a range of agents consolidated around a new set of
economic ideas to replace those that had collapsed. As the orthodoxy
underpinning existing policies was replaced, these polices lost the ide-
ational armour that had protected them from change. Sweden had accepted
the idea of an alternative economic paradigm.
The coalition government sought to fundamentally change the econ-
omy’s structure. To right the economy, it slashed the role of the state,
selling its shares in 34 companies, with a value of SKr250 billion ~Inves-
tors Chronicle, 1991: 68; European Report, 1991: 1; The Economist, 1991:
62!. In limiting how far state responsibility should extend, Carl Bidlt
challenged the conventional wisdom since the 1930s ~Taylor, 1991c: 2!.
According to the OECD ~1992: 44! a central element of the new eco-
nomic program was reduced taxes, matched to reduced spending, to
encourage efficiency. Competitive forces were given a greater role in
allocating resources in the economy ~OECD, 1992: 40!. The new admin-
istration reduced the benefits system, and began abolishing the employee
investment funds, using their resources to support the development of
companies ~Whitney, 1991: 11; Hadenius, 1997: 153!. This change re-
flected concerns that the expansion of the public sector involved high
costs in lost economic dynamism and had undermined Sweden’s growth
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prospects. In seeking to change Sweden from social democracy to a more
free market economy, this government achieved more in its first six weeks
in office than any pervious non-socialist administration.
Economic crisis led to the collapse of the dominant economic ortho-
doxy. The SAF, acting as a policy entrepreneur, introduced monetarist
economic ideas, around which consensus developed, leading to their con-
solidation. Following the SAP’s electoral defeat advocates of monetar-
ism set about changing the setting, instruments, and hierarchy of goals
behind economic policy, constituting a third-order change ~paradigm shift!
in macro-economic policy. This change in macro-economic policy, pre-
ceded by macro-economic crisis and ideational change, constituted a crit-
ical juncture.
Of the four macro-economic crises examined, two ~America 1979–
1981; Sweden 1990–1992! witnessed third-order changes ~paradigm
shifts! in macro-economic policy. We can see from the case studies that
these third-order policy changes occurred following the collapse of the
dominant economic orthodoxies, the introduction of new ideas into the
policy arenas, and the subsequent consolidation of change agents around
these ideas. The other two macro-economic crises ~Sweden 1980–1982;
America 1990–1992! did not witness third-order changes in macro-
TABLE 2
The Identification of Ideational Change
America Sweden
Observable Implications
1979–
1981
1990–
1992
1980–
1982
1990–
1992
O1. A clear change agent ~political entrepreneur! to inject
new ideas into the policy arena is apparent. X X
O2. Opposition parties critique current model and propose
alternative economic ideas; at elections their
platforms are built around these ideas. X X
O3. Civil society organizations critique current model,
reflecting Hall’s coalition-centred approach. X X X
O4. A clear set of alternative economic ideas are evident. X X
O5. Widespread public dissatisfaction with current
paradigm, is observable through opinion polls,
protests etc. X X
O6. External0international organizations critique current
model and0or actively disseminate alternative
economic ideas. X X X X
O7. Media question efficacy of current economic model
and0or specific policy areas. X X X X
Ideational Consolidation X X
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economic policy. Although ideational collapse occurred in both cases,
change agents did not consolidate around replacement economic
orthodoxies. Consequently, the hierarchy of goals behind existing macro-
economic policy did not change.
The findings validate our hypothesis. A critical juncture in macro-
economic policy consists of three stages: macro-economic crisis, ide-
ational change and radical policy change. The findings show that a
macro-economic crisis is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a
paradigm shift in macro-economic policy. A macro-economic crisis not
followed by ideational change will at most lead to a first- or second-
order macro-economic policy change ~Sweden 1980–1982; America
1990–1992!, whereas a macro-economic crisis followed by ideational
change ~collapse and consolidation! will witness a third-order change ~par-
adigm shift! in macro-economic policy ~America 1979–1981; Sweden
1990–1992!.
Thus, when examining the degree of macro-economic policy change
in the wake of a macro-economic crisis, ideas occupy a central, and dichot-
omous, position. The extant ideational orthodoxy provides the armour
protecting existing macro-economic policy, ensuring continuity. How-
ever, should ideational collapse occur, then the existing macro-economic
policy is no longer armoured. If change agents subsequently consolidate
around a new set of economic ideas the result will be ideational change,
and a third-order change in macro-economic policy. However, if these
agents fail to consolidate around a new economic orthodoxy, extant ideas
will endure, ensuring a first- or second-order policy change at most. There-
fore, ideational change clearly constitutes the “differentiating factor”
between an economic crisis that leads to a paradigm shift in macro-
economic policy and one that does not.
TABLE 3
The Identification of Change in Government Economic Policy
America Sweden
Observable Implications
1979–
1981
1990–
1992
1980–
1982
1990–
1992
O1. If economic policy instrument settings changed, there
may have been a radical change in economic policy. X X X X
O2. If the instruments of economic policy changed, there
may have been radical change in government
economic policy. X X X
O3. If the hierarchy of goals behind economic policy
changed, there may have been a radical change in
government economic policy. X X
Critical Juncture in Macroeconomic Policy X X
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Conclusion
As political science is continuously seeking better tools with which to
make sense of change, any new, or revised, instrument should be wel-
comed. This paper seeks to develop an improved framework, incorporat-
ing an a priori element, for examining critical junctures. We hypothesize
that a critical juncture in macro-economic policy consists of macro-
economic crisis, ideational change and radical policy change. Of the case
studies examined, America 1979–1981 and Sweden 1990–1992 fulfilled
all three stages. In both cases the ideational foundations of existing macro-
economic policy collapsed in the wake of economic crises and were
replaced as change agents consolidated around new economic orthodox-
ies. Third-order macro-economic policy change, paradigm shift, fol-
lowed ideational change. America 1959–1961 was merely an economic
downturn, but Sweden 1980–1982 and America 1990–1992 constituted
economic crises. While ideational collapse occurred in both cases, change
agents did not consolidate around viable alternative ideas and, in the
absence of ideational change, there was only minor macro-economic pol-
icy change.
We conclude that during a macro-economic crisis, ideational change
is the key component leading to third-order change in macro-economic
policy. Established policies, and the armoured protection afforded by their
underpinning ideas, having been brought into question by previous fail-
ures, are liable to be overcome by change agents consolidating around
new ideas ~America 1979–1981; Sweden 1990–1992!. In the absence of
ideational change, the level of policy change, in response to a macro-
economic crisis, will be either of the first- or second-order, but not the
third. Thus, economic policy instrument settings and the instruments them-
selves may change, but without ideational change the hierarchy of goals
underpinning macro-economic policy will remain unaltered ~Sweden
1980–1982; America 1990–1992!. Ideational change constitutes the dif-
ferentiating factor between those macro-economic crises that are fol-
lowed by a third-order change ~paradigm shift! in macro-economic policy
and those that are not. Following a macro-economic crisis, the presence,
or absence, of ideational change should enable us predict if there will be
a third-order change in macro-economic policy and consequently a crit-
ical juncture.
This paper draws upon crisis, ideational and institutional literature
to forge a rigorous framework capable not only of analyzing macro-
economic policy change, but other policy change also. The framework,
with minor modifications, could be utilized to predict policy outcomes
in such fields as foreign policy, democratization, gender mainstreaming,
as well as social and0or environmental policy. Testing the framework in
these policy areas should either validate and improve it or falsify it. By
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incorporating a predictive element—the differentiating factor—into the
concept of critical junctures the framework breaks new ground. Research-
ers, having identified a crisis ~of whatever kind!, and ideational change,
should be able to predict that a third-order policy change, a paradigm
shift, is coming, or if it has taken place, that the event constitutes a crit-
ical juncture. Researchers will no longer have to wait years to be able to
declare an event a critical juncture. The predictive element broadens the
concept’s applicability, deepens its incisiveness, and contributes to a bet-
ter understanding of policy change.
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